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I. INTRODUCTION
 Much of the responsibility for the recent spike in foreclosure rates, one of the 
symptoms of the “subprime crisis,” has been placed on lenders who failed to appro-
priately assess the risks involved in the loans they originated.  Such lenders allegedly 
overlooked weak borrower credit histories, high loan-to-value ratios, and sketchy 
borrower income documentation to originate higher cost loans1 that were promptly 
sold to third parties.  In congressional testimony, Federal Reserve Chairman 
Bernanke described how changes in the mortgage industry may have led to the cur-
rent foreclosure crisis:
The originate-to-distribute model seems to have contributed to the loosening 
of underwriting standards in 2005 and 2006.  When an originator sells a 
mortgage and its servicing rights, depending on the terms of the sale, much 
or all of the risks are passed on to the loan purchaser.  Thus, originators who 
sell loans may have less incentive to undertake careful underwriting than if 
they kept the loans.  Moreover, for some originators, fees tied to loan volume 
made loan sales a higher priority than loan quality.  This misalignment of 
incentives, together with strong investor demand for securities with high 
yields, contributed to the weakening of underwriting standards.2
 This study isolates the 2006 performance of one category of mortgage lenders—
banks originating loans in their Community Reinvestment Act3 (“CRA”) assessment 
areas, referred to hereinafter as “CRA Banks.”  Our hypothesis is that the CRA, 
which requires banks to help serve the credit needs of their local communities, in-
cluding low- and moderate-income (“LMI”) neighborhoods, consistent with safe and 
sound banking practices, may have deterred banks from engaging, at least in their 
local communities, in lending practices that fuel foreclosures.
 To test our hypothesis, we analyzed 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(“HMDA”) data to compare the lending performance of CRA Banks4 with other 
1. For the purposes of this article, “higher cost loans” are first lien mortgage loans with annual percentage 
rates (“APR”) at least three percentage points higher than the yields on comparable maturity U.S. 
Treasury securities.  The spread between the APR and Treasury security yield is reported on these loans 
pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2811 (2006).
2. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, 
U.S. House of Representatives: Subprime Mortgage Lending and Mitigating Foreclosures, (Sept. 20, 
2007) [hereinafter Bernanke Testimony], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/.
testimony/bernanke20070920a.htm.
3. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006).
4. For the purposes of this article, a “CRA Bank” is a CRA-reporting bank making mortgage loans 
subject to the CRA (i.e., in its CRA assessment area) in the fifteen most populous MSAs.  “Non-CRA 
Banks” refer to banks that filed a CRA report but whose assessment area did not include the MSA 
analyzed.  The statistics exclude loans made by banks that did not file a CRA Disclosure Report, 
presumably because the banks did not meet the asset size threshold.  Such loans constituted 1.6% of all 
loans made in the fifteen most populous metropolitan statistical areas.  In computing the lending 
performance of a CRA Bank, only loans originated by the bank are included.  While a bank has the 
option of including affiliate lending in its CRA assessment, 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(c) (2008), only direct 
lending must be assessed.  Calculations that include affiliate lending are set forth in Appendix B, and 
they do not affect the conclusions of this report.
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lenders in the fifteen most populous U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (“MSAs”) 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau as of July 1, 2006.  For each MSA, Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council data was obtained on the CRA assess-
ment area(s) of every bank that filed a CRA Disclosure Report5 and on each 
HMDA-reported origination.  Using this data, each loan was categorized according 
to whether it was a higher cost loan, whether it was originated to an LMI borrower, 
the type of lender originating it, and the geography in which it was originated.
 This study examined HMDA-reported conventional, owner-occupied, first lien, 
home purchase loans.  Four areas relevant to the foreclosure crisis were reviewed: (1) 
the proportion of higher cost loans; (2) the pricing of higher cost loans; (3) the pro-
portion of originated loans retained by the lender; and (4) the relationship between 
foreclosure rates and concentration of bank branches.
 A. Summary Conclusions
 Our study concludes that CRA Banks were substantially less likely than other lenders 
to make the kinds of risky home purchase loans that helped fuel the foreclosure crisis. 
Specifically, our analysis shows that:
 1. CRA Banks were 66% less likely than other lenders to make a higher cost  
  loan;
 2. The average annual percentage rate (APR) on higher cost loans originated  
  by CRA Banks was sixty-eight basis points lower than the average APR on  
  higher cost loans originated by other lenders;
 3. CRA Banks were more than twice as likely as other lenders to retain origi- 
  nated loans in their portfolio; and
 4. Foreclosure rates were lower in MSAs with greater concentrations of bank  
  branches.
 B. CRA Background
 The CRA was enacted by Congress in 1977 in response to allegations that banks 
and thrifts were engaged in the practice of “redlining,” also known as deposit expor-
tation.6  Senate Banking Committee Chairman and bill sponsor William Proxmire 
of Wisconsin broadly defined “redlining” as the taking of deposits received from 
customers in lower-income neighborhoods and investing that money elsewhere.7  It 
was widely believed that this practice was a significant cause of the deterioration of 
urban neighborhoods.
 The CRA was, and remains, a terse, precatory statute that requires each federally-
insured bank and thrift that grants credit to the public in the ordinary course of 
business to meet “the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and 
5. Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 228.42(g) (2008), “[a] bank, except a small bank or a bank that was a small 
bank during the prior calendar year, shall collect and report to the Board by March 1 of each year a list 
for each assessment area showing the geographies within the area.”
6. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006) (stating the purpose of this is to “encourage [financial] institutions to help 
meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered”).
7. See 123 Cong. Rec. 17,603–04 (1977).
230
THE CRA: A WELCOME ANOMALY IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation of 
such institution.”8
 The CRA is enforced by the bank’s or thrift’s primary federal regulator, which is 
charged with assessing the institution’s record of meeting community credit needs. 
Each institution receives a public grade of “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory,” “Needs to 
improve,” or “Substantial non-compliance.”9  In addition, the CRA directs the fed-
eral regulator to “take such record into account” in its evaluation of certain applications 
for regulatory approval.10
II. DISCUSSION
A. Higher Cost Loans
 Higher cost loans are a primary driver of the foreclosure crisis, as borrowers who 
are unable to afford their mortgage payments default on their loans.  There is a very 
high statistical correlation (0.816) between the proportion of lending that is higher 
cost and the foreclosure rate in the MSAs analyzed.11  Default rates rose in 2008, as 
monthly payments increased on mortgage products that permitted borrowers to pay 
lower “teaser” rates for the first few years of a loan.12
All Borrowers
 Unlike other lenders, whose market share of higher cost loans in the fifteen most 
populous MSAs was greater than their overall market share, CRA Banks had a sig-
nificantly lower market share of higher cost loans than of all loans.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2006).
9. 12 C.F.R. pt. 228 app. A (2008) (Federal Reserve Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 app. A (2008) (Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. pt. 345 app. A (2008) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 
12 C.F.R. pt. 563e app. A (2008) (Office of Thrift Supervision).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2) (2006).
11. See infra app. A, fig. A-1.  Correlation is a commonly used measure of the strength and direction of a 
linear relationship between two variables (obtained by dividing the sample covariance of the variables by 
the product of their sample standard deviations).  Correlation ranges from +1 to -1.  If one variable tends 
to increase as the other decreases, the correlation is negative.  Conversely, if the two variables tend to 
increase together the correlation is positive.  The stronger the linear relationship between the variables, 
the higher the absolute correlation between the variables.  Therefore, if there is a perfect linear 
relationship between two variables the correlation is 1 (either positive or negative); if there is no linear 
relationship between the two variables the correlation is 0.
12. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA 
National Delinquency Survey (2008), http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/64769.
htm.
  
Indeed, in each of the fifteen most populous MSAs, CRA Banks were less likely 
than other lenders to originate a higher cost loan.13  Overall, CRA Banks were 66% 
less likely than other lenders to originate a higher cost loan.
13. Calculations for CRA Banks combine figures for the fifteen most populous MSAs, effectively causing 
MSAs with more loans to have greater weight.
All Loan Market Share
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans 
in 15 Most Populous MSAs
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Figure 1
All Loans All High Cost Loans
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
77.2%
22.8%
90.8%
9.2%
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 Significantly, the lower proportion of higher cost loan originations by CRA 
Banks was not caused by CRA Banks being more likely to deny a loan application. 
In the fifteen MSAs analyzed, CRA Banks were 16% less likely than other lenders 
to deny an application.  (CRA Banks had a 15.2% denial rate; other lenders had an 
18.1% denial rate.)14
14. Denial rates are for submitted applications and therefore exclude purchases and pre-approvals.  The 
figures also exclude HMDA filers who did not originate at least one loan in 2006.
Higher Cost Loans As a Percentage of Total Originations
by CRA Banks and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 
15 Most Populous MSAs
Figure 2
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Los Angeles
Miami
New York
Phoenix
Philadelphia
Riverside, CA
San Francisco
Seattle
Washington, D.C.
ALL MSAs
Percent that CRA Banks 
were less likely to 
originate higher cost
66
80
58
67
17
72
65
63
83
60
60
42
78
86
78
66
27.5%
9.5%
21.2%
4.2%
33.5%
14.0%
32.8%
11.0%
39.0%
32.3%
40.3%
11.2%
39.4%
13.9%
19.3%
52.3%
29.1%
4.9%
21.3%
8.6%
34.1%
13.6%
44.7%
25.8%
31.4%
6.8%
3.1%
6.0%
11.5%
33.5%
26.7%
31.4%
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 Low- and Moderate-Income Borrowers
 The foreclosure crisis particularly impacts LMI borrowers:15
[Lower-income borrowers] are increasingly devoting more than half of their 
income to housing costs . . . . It is easy to imagine that for low-income 
households living at the margins of their budgets, even small increases in 
monthly housing costs can have a significant effect on their ability to cover 
living expenses and keep up with their monthly payments.  If one considers 
the potential for other payment shocks, such as unforeseen medical expenses, 
the risks of default and foreclosure are even greater.16
 Serving the credit needs of LMI borrowers is arguably the most important facet 
of a CRA performance examination, which evaluates a bank according to the number 
and dollar volume of LMI loans originated or purchased in its assessment area.17 
Like total lending, CRA Banks’ market share of higher cost loans made to LMI bor-
rowers was significantly lower than their market share of all loans to LMI borrowers 
in the fifteen most populous MSAs.
 Overall, CRA Banks were 58% less likely than other lenders to originate higher 
cost loans to LMI borrowers.
15. A borrower is LMI if his or her income is less than 80% of the area’s median income.  For a borrower 
located in an MSA, the area median income is the median family income for the MSA.  See 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 228.12(b)(1), (m)(1)–(2) (2008).
16. Naomi Cytron & Laura Lanzerotti, Homeownership at High Cost: Recent Trends in the Mortgage Lending 
Industry, Community Investments (Fed. Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Dec. 2006, at 6.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(b)(3) (2008).
Figure 3
LMI Loan Market Share 
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 15 
Most Populous MSAs
All LMI Loans All LMI High Cost Loans
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
77.3%
22.7%
88.9%
11.1%
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B. APR on Higher Cost Loans
All Borrowers
 When CRA Banks did originate higher cost loans, the average APR was appre-
ciably lower than the average APR on higher cost loans originated by other lenders. 
Overall, the average higher cost loan made by CRA Banks was priced sixty-eight 
basis points lower than the average higher cost loan originated by other lenders.
Higher Cost Loans As a Percentage of Total Originations to LMI 
Borrowers by CRA Banks and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 15 
Most Populous MSAs
Figure 4
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Los Angeles
Miami
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Riverside, CA
San Francisco
Seattle
Washington, D.C.
ALL MSAs
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
Percent that CRA Banks 
were less likely to 
originate higher cost
67
78
48
53
  9
64
69
69
70
55
67
60
90
85
80
58
35.2%
11.6%
4.0%
19.7%
22.1%
41.0%
18.8%
37.9%
46.8%
44.9%
55.0%
19.9%
30.6%
9.5%
40.5%
12.6%
18.3%
5.5%
30.3%
1.7%
37.6%
12.5%
30.5%
12.3%
22.7%
2.4%
23.8%
30.6%
25.1%
5.0%
15.4%
36.%
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Average Rate Spreads on Higher Cost Loans Originated
by CRA Banks and Other Lenders18
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans
 in 15 Most Populous MSAs
LMI Borrowers
 The APR difference on higher cost loans originated to LMI borrowers was even 
greater than the difference for all loans.  Overall, higher cost loans made by CRA 
Banks to LMI borrowers were priced seventy-four basis points lower than higher 
cost loans originated to LMI borrowers by other lenders.
18. The rate spread is the APR minus the yield on the Treasury security with a comparable maturity and is 
only reported for higher cost loans.  The average rate spread for a geography is the mean rate spread (i.e., 
the sum of the rate spreads divided by the total number of higher cost loans).
Figure 5
Magnitude of Lower APR 
for CRA Banks 
(in basic points)
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Los Angeles
Miami
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Riverside, CA
San Francisco
Seattle
Washington, D.C.
ALL MSAs
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
75
71
31
93
72
89
66
100
96
69
110
61
9
83
87
68
5.44
4.90
5.21
4.52
5.23
4.73
5.48
4.68
5.34
4.57
5.46
5.33
6.05
4.51
5.35
4.67
5.36
4.34
5.31
4.33
5.32
4.40
5.22
5.09
5.18
4.78
5.39
4.25
4.68
5.36
4.26
5.13
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C. Loan Retention
 As noted by Chairman Bernanke, “originators who sell loans may have less in-
centive to undertake careful underwriting than if they kept the loans.”19  Federal 
Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner has added:
[T]he originate-to-distribute model can leave lenders with weaker incentives 
to maintain strong underwriting standards.  In particular, originators who 
19. Bernanke Testimony, supra note 2, at 3.
Average Rate Spreads on Higher Cost Loans to LMI Borrowers
by CRA Banks and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 
15 Most Populous MSAs
Figure 6
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
Magnitude of Lower APR 
for CRA Banks 
(in basic points)
93
54
40
100
83
103
177
101
84
60
121
138
110
86
69
74ALL MSAs
Washington, D.C.
Seattle
San Francisco
Riverside, CA
Phoenix
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New York
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Los Angeles
Houston
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Chicago
Boston
Atlanta 5.64
4.71
5.25
4.71
5.32
4.93
5.53
4.52
6.20
5.37
5.54
4.51
5.50
3.74
5.50
4.49
5.28
4.44
5.49
4.89
5.53
4.32
5.70
4.33
5.33
4.23
5.34
4.48
5.28
4.59
5.55
4.81
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securitize may inadequately screen potential borrowers unless investors 
provide oversight and insist on practices that align originator incentives with 
the underlying risk.  The originate-to-distribute system is thus not only a 
potential source of risk to the financial system but also raises concerns 
regarding consumer protection.20
 CRA Banks were more than twice as likely as other lenders to retain originated 
loans in their portfolio.21  While banks in general would be expected to retain more 
loans than non-depository lenders, our study also found that CRA Banks were sig-
nificantly more likely to retain loans they originate in their CRA assessment areas 
than banks without CRA responsibilities in those areas (Non-CRA Banks).  As in-
dicated below, this distinction held for all loans, including higher cost loans, loans to 
LMI borrowers, and higher cost loans to LMI borrowers.
 
With few exceptions, these overall findings were reflected in the findings for each 
metropolitan area analyzed.  Please see Figures A-2 through A-5 in Appendix A for 
details.
20. Governor Randall S. Kroszner, Speech at Consumer Bankers Association 2007 Fair Lending Conference: 
The Challenges Facing Subprime Mortgage Borrowers (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20071105a.htm.
21. For analytical purposes, we considered a loan to be held in portfolio if it had a HMDA-reported Type 
of Purchaser code of “0,” indicating the loan was not sold during 2006.
Proportion of Loans Held in Portfolio
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 
15 Most Populous MSAs
Figure 7
   CRA Banks   Non-CRA Banks Lenders       All Lenders except CRABanks
All Loans High Cost Loans Loans to LMI 
Borrowers
High Cost Loans 
to LMI 
Borrowers
36.2
18.6
16.4
28.7
13.0
14.2
41.7
18.1
18.9
36.9
12.6
15.8
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D. Bank Branch Concentration and Property Foreclosure Rates
 Foreclosure rates are lower in metropolitan areas that have proportionately more 
bank branches.  For the reasons explained below, we suspect that the CRA’s focus on 
service to communities where a bank’s branches are located may have caused CRA 
Banks to more carefully underwrite loans and, consequently, make fewer nonper-
forming loans.
 Overall, our study found a very high negative statistical correlation (-0.764) be-
tween the number of bank branches and the number of properties with foreclosure 
filings per owner-occupied housing unit.  The graph below contrasts each MSA’s 
foreclosure rate to its proportional number of bank branches.  Note the trend line 
which indicates that the higher a metropolitan area’s concentration of bank branches, 
the lower the foreclosure rate there.
 Sources: Foreclosure data is for the third quarter of 2007 and derived from RealtyTrac’s®  
 release dated November 14, 2007; bank branch data is from the FDIC.22
22. Foreclosure property figures for Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York, Lake County in Illinois, and 
Kenosha County in Wisconsin are based on estimates.  Foreclosure figures for Rockingham and 
Strafford counties in New Hampshire included in the Boston foreclosure figure were obtained directly 
from RealtyTrac® rather than from the November 14, 2007 press release on third quarter 2007 
metropolitan area foreclosure rates.
Figure 8
Foreclosure Rates and Bank Branch Concentration
Per Owner-Occupied Housing Unit in 15 Most Populous MSAs
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 Foreclosure rates are impacted by a range of economic and demographic factors, 
including, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, housing prices and un-
employment rates.23  However, the negative correlation between bank branch 
concentration and foreclosure rate was substantially higher in absolute value than the 
correlation between foreclosure rate and unemployment rate (0.574)24 and slightly 
higher in absolute value than the negative correlation between foreclosure rate and 
change in housing prices (-0.721).25
 A bank’s CRA responsibilities to a community emanate from the presence of a 
branch there,26 and, as noted above, a bank’s record of serving the credit needs of 
LMI borrowers in its community is arguably the most important facet of CRA com-
pliance.  In addition, CRA examinations assess a bank’s distribution of branches and 
its “record of opening and closing branches, particularly branches located in [LMI] 
geographies . . . or primarily serving [LMI] individuals.”27  The CRA’s emphasis on 
branches may have helped limit the proportion of higher cost lending for two rea-
sons.
 First, ready access to a bank branch allows a borrower to conveniently apply for a 
mortgage loan directly from a local institution.  This obviates the need to use a 
mortgage broker, where loans are often more expensive.28  In its review of 2004 
HMDA data, Federal Reserve Board staff noted the “incidence of higher-priced 
lending is significantly higher for borrowers who live outside the assessment areas of 
lenders covered by the [CRA] than for those who live inside these areas.”29  The 
HMDA data do not provide a reason for this pattern, but several explanations that 
warrant further research are possible. For example, the “difference may be due, at 
least in part, to a reliance on different delivery channels for loans within and outside 
these lenders’ assessment areas.”30
 Second, the CRA’s mandate to serve local communities may, albeit indirectly, 
encourage CRA Banks to more closely scrutinize the creditworthiness of borrowers 
who submit loan applications at their assessment area branches.  The more loans a 
23. Kristopher Gerardi, Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, 
Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 07-15, 
2007) (analyzing homeownership experiences in Massachusetts).
24. Unemployment rate is for the September 2007 civilian labor force (not seasonally adjusted) from the 
U.S. Department of Labor.
25. Third quarter 2007 annual percent change in median sales price of existing single-family homes (not 
seasonally adjusted) from the National Association of REALTORS®.
26. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.41 (2008).
27. Id. § 228.24.
28. See, e.g., Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Credit, Capital and Communities: 
The Implications of the Changing Mortgage Banking Industry for Community Based 
Organizations 4 (2004).
29. Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner & Robert E. Cook, New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its 
Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 Fed. Res. Bull. 344, 370 (2005) (internal citation 
omitted).
30. Id.
240
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CRA Bank makes in its assessment area, especially to LMI borrowers, the greater 
the likelihood that examiners will conclude it is fulfilling its CRA obligations. 
Therefore, in order to compete with other lenders in their CRA assessment area, 
CRA Banks may price loans more aggressively there.  Heightened scrutiny of a bor-
rower’s creditworthiness minimizes the likelihood of mistaking a person with good 
credit as a poor credit risk.  It may also have the collateral effect of reducing the like-
lihood that a CRA Bank would inadvertently offer higher cost loans to prospective 
borrowers who actually qualify for less expensive loans.  The lower loan rates, and 
the fact that creditworthiness has been thoroughly investigated before the loan is ap-
proved, may also contribute to the lower foreclosure rates associated with these 
loans.
III. CONCLUSION
 Our study suggests that without the CRA, the subprime crisis and related spike 
in foreclosures might have negatively impacted even more borrowers and neighbor-
hoods.  Compared to other lenders in their assessment areas, CRA Banks were less 
likely to make a higher cost loan, charged less for the higher cost loans that were 
made, and were substantially more likely to eschew the secondary market and hold 
higher cost and other loans in portfolio.  Moreover, branch availability is a key ele-
ment of CRA compliance, and foreclosure rates were lower in metropolitan areas 
with proportionately greater numbers of bank branches.
 Prior to the foreclosure crisis, some had suggested that the boom in subprime 
mortgage lending, by easing access to credit for LMI borrowers, rendered the CRA 
irrelevant or obsolete.31  However, the demise of subprime lending, even if only tem-
porary, and the lower proportion of higher cost loans made by CRA Banks, even 
when the subprime market was thriving, suggest that the CRA still has a vital role to 
play.
 Of course, CRA Banks, even in their own assessment areas, have a relatively 
small portion of the mortgage market.  In the fifteen metropolitan areas analyzed, 
the CRA Bank market share of all loan originations was less than 25%, limiting the 
law’s impact on the subprime crisis.
 Because the vast majority of mortgage lending is done by other entities, some 
have suggested extending CRA-like obligations to other lenders as a way of limiting 
the volume of higher cost loans and the problems associated with them.  While ex-
tending the CRA to bank affiliates and subsidiaries that lend in the bank’s community 
may have some merit, we believe that the presence of local brick and mortar branches 
was as important a reason for CRA Banks’ better performance as the fear of a less 
than satisfactory CRA evaluation.
 Branches demonstrate a bank’s commitment to and investment in a community. 
The on-going interaction between bankers and residents that occurs at a deposit-
31. E.g., Jeffery W. Gunther, Should CRA Stand for “Community Redundancy Act”?, 23 Reg. 56 (2000), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n3/gunther.pdf.
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taking branch provides insight into credit needs that may enable banks to make more 
reliable assessments of borrowers’ creditworthiness and to avoid making loans that 
are likely to default.  In addition, by providing borrowers with a convenient location 
at which to apply for mortgage loans, branches may serve as a magnet for attracting 
creditworthy borrowers.  Without a branch nexus, it is doubtful whether the same 
benefits can be realized for other lenders.
242
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APPENDIX A
 Source: Foreclosure data is for the third quarter of 2007 and derived from RealtyTrac’s®  
 press release dated November 14, 2007.32
32. See supra note 22.
Figure A-1
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Loan Retention Proportions for Each MSA
Proportion of All Loans Held in Portfolio
Metropolitan Area CRA Banks Non-CRA Banks
All Lenders
Except CRA Banks
Atlanta 36.4% 14.0% 19.6%
Boston 46.4% 24.9% 24.3%
Chicago 28.8% 27.9% 17.0%
Dallas 37.9% 22.8% 16.1%
Detroit 16.2% 24.8% 18.0%
Houston 34.4% 12.0% 18.2%
Los Angeles 42.5% 19.0% 14.9%
Miami 36.2% 12.9% 13.1%
New York 34.8% 19.4% 16.8%
Philadelphia 34.4% 16.5% 13.7%
Phoenix 37.1% 20.7% 15.9%
Riverside, CA 31.6% 12.9% 13.9%
San Francisco 53.5% 21.5% 15.3%
Seattle 37.7% 22.8% 14.6%
Washington, D.C. 39.6% 11.8% 16.2%
Proportion of All Higher Cost Loans Held in Portfolio
Metropolitan Area CRA Banks Non-CRA Banks
All Lenders
Except CRA Banks
Atlanta 33.7% 12.7% 14.5%
Boston 30.0% 14.3% 13.9%
Chicago 20.2% 18.3% 14.0%
Dallas 64.4% 15.4% 17.1%
Detroit 10.3% 24.9% 18.4%
Houston 52.5%   8.8% 15.8%
Los Angeles 24.3%   8.3% 15.7%
Miami 30.2% 11.9% 11.5%
New York 26.3% 12.8% 12.1%
Philadelphia 28.6% 13.5% 12.9%
Phoenix 46.5% 16.0% 14.9%
Riverside, CA 21.8%   5.4% 14.4%
San Francisco 24.0% 11.2% 13.9%
Seattle 48.6% 17.7% 15.9%
Washington, D.C. 25.4% 11.5% 11.8%
Figure A-2
Figure A-3
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Proportion of All Loans to LMI Borrowers Held in Portfolio
Metropolitan Area CRA Banks Non-CRA Banks
All Lenders
Except CRA Banks
Atlanta 51.8% 11.3% 19.7%
Boston 56.1% 23.7% 27.5%
Chicago 30.4% 19.5% 16.4%
Dallas 54.3% 32.0% 20.5%
Detroit 15.2% 19.9% 20.8%
Houston 50.3%   7.7% 18.4%
Los Angeles 40.6% 49.3% 37.8%
Miami 50.3% 15.4% 18.8%
New York 37.6% 19.6% 20.5%
Philadelphia 43.1% 12.3% 13.1%
Phoenix 42.4% 15.1% 15.0%
Riverside, CA 33.2% 11.1% 24.0%
San Francisco 56.8% 33.6% 25.2%
Seattle 35.7% 19.1% 16.9%
Washington, D.C. 50.3% 10.4% 19.9%
Proportion of All Higher Cost Loans to LMI Borrowers Held in Portfolio
Metropolitan Area CRA Banks Non-CRA Banks
All Lenders
Except CRA Banks
Atlanta 35.4%   9.6% 13.6%
Boston 30.8% 13.6% 16.8%
Chicago 26.6% 14.9% 13.2%
Dallas 77.4% 19.3% 18.7%
Detroit 10.1% 20.5% 19.6%
Houston 62.2%   5.5% 15.9%
Los Angeles 84.1% 62.5% 63.7%
Miami 42.5% 12.8% 12.9%
New York 33.6% 13.3% 14.6%
Philadelphia 28.5% 10.5% 11.6%
Phoenix 48.0% 14.7% 14.2%
Riverside, CA 41.4%   9.3% 43.8%
San Francisco 62.5% 17.6% 37.4%
Seattle 48.8% 13.2% 17.4%
Washington, D.C. 30.8%   8.1% 11.3%
Figure A-4
Figure A-5
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Foreclosure Rates and Bank Branch Concentration 
Ranked by Foreclosure Rates in 15 Most Populous MSAs
Metropolitan Area
# of Properties 
with Foreclosure 
Filings1
# of Owner 
Occupied Housing 
Units2
Foreclosure 
Rate3
# of Bank 
Branches4
Proportion of 
Bank 
Branches5
Riverside, CA 20,664 838,093 0.0247 570 0.00068
Detroit 22,876 1,261,188 0.0181 1,210 0.00096
Miami 24,144 1,357,812 0.0178 1,583 0.00117
Atlanta 18,940 1,261,351 0.0150 1,428 0.00113
Phoenix 11,242 979,314 0.0115 862 0.00088
Los Angeles 22,338 2,170,255 0.0103 2,401 0.00111
San Francisco 8,988 906,476 0.0099 1,023 0.00113
Dallas 11,618 1,327,280 0.0088 1,718 0.00129
Chicago 17,355 2,328,139 0.0075 3,244 0.00139
Houston 8,500 1,182,763 0.0072 1,460 0.00123
Washington, D.C. 7,699 1,318,546 0.0058 1,683 0.00128
Boston 5,471 1,082,956 0.0051 1,461 0.00135
New York 13,939 3,609,780 0.0039 5,632 0.00156
Philadelphia 4,912 1,533,934 0.0032 1,956 0.00128
Seattle 2,639 819,357 0.0032 918 0.00112
1See sources cited supra note 22.
2U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006 American Community Survey.
3Number of Properties with Foreclosures per Owner Occupied Housing Unit.
4Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as of June 30, 2007.
5Number of Bank Branches per Owner Occupied Housing Unit.
Figure A-6
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APPENDIX B
 This Appendix recalculates relevant figures from the study to contrast the lending 
of CRA Banks and their subsidiaries and holding company affiliates to other lenders. 
While the recalculation nominally narrows the statistical gaps the study found be-
tween CRA Banks and other lenders, the conclusions of the study still hold.
All Loan Market Share
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans 
in 15 Most Populous MSAs
All Loans All Higher Cost Loans
15.7%
84.3%69.6%
31.4%
Figure B-1
  CRA Banks  Other Lenders
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Higher Cost Loans As a Percentage of Total Originations by CRA 
Banks (including affiliates) and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 
15 Most Populous MSAs
Percent that CRA Banks 
were less likely to 
originate higher 
cost loans
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Figure B-2
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LMI Loan Market Share 
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase 
Loans in 15 Most Populous MSAs
All LMI Loans All Higher Cost Loans
32.5%
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17.4%
82.6%
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Figure B-3
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Higher Cost Loans As a Percentage of Total Originations to LMI 
Borrowers by CRA Banks (Including Affiliates) and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans in 
15 Most Populous MSAs
Percent that CRA Banks 
were less likely to 
originate higher 
cost loans
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250
THE CRA: A WELCOME ANOMALY IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
Average Rate Spreads on Higher Cost Loans Originated by CRA 
Banks (Including Affiliates) and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans 
in 15 Most Populous MSAs
Magnitude of Lower APR 
for CRA Banks 
(in basic points)
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Average Rate Spreads on Higher Cost Loans to LMI Borrowers by 
CRA Banks (Including Affiliates) and Other Lenders
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase Loans 
in 15 Most Populous MSAs
Magnitude of Lower APR 
for CRA Banks 
(in basic points)
50
53
45
47
105
76
167
74
69
43
101
132
85
45
32
61
5.66
Washington, D.C.
ALL MSAs
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Houston
Los Angeles
Miami
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Riverside, CA
San Francisco
Seattle
5.35
4.90
5.53
5.06
6.27
5.22
5.16
5.25
4.72
5.55
5.51
4.79
3.84
5.54
4.80
5.31
4.62
5.50
5.07
5.54
4.53
5.73
4.41
5.35
4.50
5.37
4.92
5.29
4.97
5.57
4.96
  CRA Banks and Affiliates  Other Lenders
Figure B-6
252
THE CRA: A WELCOME ANOMALY IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
Proportion of Loans Held in Portfolio
2006 Conventional, Owner-Occupied, 1st Lien, Home Purchase 
Loans in 15 Most Populous MSAs
  CRA Banks  Non-CRA Banks Lenders 
  All Lenders except CRA Banks and Affiliates
High Cost 
Loans to LMI 
Borrowers
Loans to LMI 
Borrowers
High Cost 
Loans
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30.5
18.6
16.6
13.0
21.6
14.5
34.3
18.1
19.2
27.4
12.6
16.2
